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Abstract 
 
This paper suggests a way to think about human well-being and psychological 
health.  It distinguishes between mental stocks and flows.  Central to the 
analysis is a concept we refer to as hedonic capital.  This can be thought of as a 
level of emotional coping resources, or as the underlying stock to which the 
economist’s idea of a flow of utility corresponds.  The model replicates the 
patterns found in the recent empirical psychology and economics literature: 
there is an approximately stable level of mental well-being and an automatic 
tendency to adapt back towards that level.  Conventional economic theory does 
not fit these facts. 
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Hedonic Capital and the Foundations of Mental Health  
Liam Graham 
Andrew J Oswald 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper is about human coping and the foundations of psychological health.  
Although it is theoretical, the aim is to help the work of applied economists and to 
provide empirical predictions.  The paper builds on new research, by economists such 
as Carol Graham (2008) and psychologists such as Ann Masten (2007), at the border 
between mental and physical health.   
 
Human beings are deeply adaptive, self-repairing organisms.  They recover 
psychologically from bad life events and adapt to good ones.  Despite what 
conventional economic theory predicts, movements in mental well-being thus tend to 
exhibit a form of mean-reversion.  This is the phenomenon1 of habituation or hedonic 
adaptation.  By contrast, standard economics is silent on the possibility of 
psychological recovery, and assumes that individuals have a utility function where 
influences such as income, disability, job promotion and bereavement have lasting, 
once-and-for-all effects.   
 
How can we make conceptual sense of the fact that humans spring back indomitably 
from adversity?  Resilience as a concept is widely used in the psychology and 
psychiatry literatures.  Masten (2007) provides a review.  She defines resilience as 
“the capacity of dynamic systems to withstand or recover from significant 
disturbances” and notes that it is closely related to adaptation.  Yet the concept of 
resilience has no role, or counterpart, in the subject of economics.   
 
                                                     
1 See Frederick and Loewenstein (1999), Clark (1999), Argyle 2001, Di Tella et al (2001, 2003), Wu 
(2001), Menzel et al (2002), Easterlin (2000, 2003), Senik (2003), Lucas (2005), Lucas et al (2003, 
2004), Rayo and Becker (2007), Clark et al (2008), Di Tella, Haisken and MacCulloch (2005), Dolan 
and Kahneman (2008), Keely (2005), Oswald and Powdthavee (2008), Wilson and Gilbert (2005), 
Kahneman and Sugden (2005), Lyubomirsky, King and Diener (2005), Lyubomirsky, Sheldon and 
Schkade (2005), Ubel et al (2005), and Gardner and Oswald (2004, 2006).  An early exposition was 
provided by Duesenberry (1949). There is a related literature on other kinds of comparisons.  Recent 
research includes Frank and Sunstein (2001), Burchardt (2001), Senik (2004), Hopkins and Kornienko 
(2004), Luttmer (2005), and Alpizar, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2005).  Earlier work is 
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2. Adaptation  
 
Economists have recently applied microeconomic time-series techniques to look at the 
path of well-being over time, and the resulting response functions provide an 
illustration of adaptation.  For example Graph 1, taken from Clark et al (2008) shows, 
using data from the German GSOEP data set, the time path of the well-being of 
females who were widowed at time 0. 
Graph 1:  Response of well-being for females who were widowed at time 0 
 
The striking thing is that after 2 years the well-being of these individuals is 
statistically indistinguishable from its level before they were widowed.  Indeed, Clark 
et al (2008) cannot reject the hypothesis of complete adaptation for five out of the six 
life events they consider.  One theoretical explanation for this uses an endogenous 
reference level (see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999).  However, while such models 
give an account of adaptation, they are intrinsically ad hoc, and are silent on which 
factors affect the steady state level of well-being, and which will influence the speed 
of an individual’s adjustment back towards the steady state.   
 
Adaptive behavior creates difficulties for economic theory.  Economists are familiar 
with the idea that the marginal utility from something declines as it is consumed more 
heavily.  They are unused, however, to the notion that the sheer passing of time might 
                                                                                                                                                        
discussed in, for example, Easterlin (1974), Layard (1980), Frank (1985), Babcock, Wang and 
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alter people’s utility.  In contrast to its centrality in psychology textbooks, almost no 
attention is paid to adaptation in current economics textbooks.  This attitude among 
economists is probably partly because most are unaware of the accumulated evidence 
in applied-psychology journals.  But it is partly deeper.  It is because economists find 
unsatisfying the notion that, for unspecified reasons, human beings have a reference 
level that depends on current experience.  In the adaptation literature, the presumption 
has been that happiness is given by a utility function u = u(x – x*), where x might be a 
variable like income or health, and x* is some comparison or past reference level that 
automatically follows the actual level of x.  The gap x-x* responds endogenously -- 
and in this way better income or health can slowly cease to give extra utility.  Such a 
model of adaptive behavior, many economic theorists would argue, is uninteresting.  
First, it does not go beyond a restating of the observation to be understood.  Second, it 
gives no account of the richness of individual behavior in response to shocks. 
 
This paper suggests a different way to think about adaptation.  It constructs a 
framework that generates the observed mean-reversion of well-being.  The model 
achieves this by using methodological principles that are familiar to economists and 
without invoking an endogenous reference level.  As in the innovative work of Ng 
(1995, 1997) and Robson (2001), we view behavior as moulded by biology and 
nature.  More broadly, our work falls within an emerging area of research at the 
border between the disciplines of psychology and economics (see, for example, 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997 and Kahneman 2003).  It can also be viewed as 
part of an emerging economics of emotions (Loewenstein 2000).   
 
At the heart of the formal modelling is one idea: to understand well-being it is 
valuable to distinguish between stocks and flows.  Although it seems natural to view 
happiness as a flow variable, there is agreement in the literature that some of the 
important determinants of well-being have the nature of stocks.  For example, Carr 
(2004) writes 
 
"people with large social support networks and stronger social bonds with 
members of their networks have better physical and mental health, fewer 
                                                                                                                                                        
Loewenstein (1996), and Akerlof (1997). 
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illnesses and less depression, recover more rapidly from physical illness 
and psychological problems, and have a lower risk of death." 
 
We propose a slightly unusual concept, hedonic capital.  Later sections denote this by 
the symbol k.  We view k as the stock of coping resources available to an individual.  
When negative utility shocks hit individuals, they draw upon their k.  We leave 
unspecified its exact empirical foundations.  Significant social relationships with 
friends and colleagues may form one component of hedonic capital; our definition 
could also include health (some stock aspects of which are discussed by Grossman 
(1972, 1999)), self-esteem, status, and meaningful work.  For some people, religious 
faith may also play a part.  These things are stocks in that they rely on past inputs and 
are carried across time periods. 
 
Hedonic capital is to be thought of as the psychological equivalent to the physical 
capital used by firms.  Just as machines produce output, hedonic capital produces a 
flow of hedonic resources which might be termed hedonic energy.  We posit that this 
energy can be used either (i) to generate well-being today or (ii) to invest in hedonic 
capital to produce well-being in the future.  Hedonic capital ties together the present 
and the future.     
 
A machine that makes baked-bean cans depreciates as time passes.  So, in our model, 
does hedonic capital.  To keep the level of hedonic capital constant, human beings 
have to invest some of their mental resources in order to maintain their stock of 
hedonic capital.   
 
In order to provide a formal description of such a psychological structure, the paper 
modifies analytical methods that are familiar from some other, very different, parts of 
social science, including inter-temporal optimization theory and the Ramsey model of 
aggregate economic growth.  The novelty of the paper is not in its mathematics. 
 
We explore how evolution might rationally ‘design’ an individual to respond 
adaptively to life events.  The focus is on the limiting outcome of evolution, namely, 
the individual decision rules that are optimal from an evolutionary standpoint.  The 
paper shows that an individual so designed would: 
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• use hedonic capital to smooth2 the response of well-being to life events 
 
• exhibit a steady-state level of well-being 
  
• display adaptive behavior in response to shocks to permanent changes in 
the stock of hedonic capital. 
 
The formal analysis also suggests, first, that the lower is the level of hedonic capital 
the more volatile is an individual’s well-being level and, second, that those with low 
hedonic capital find it more difficult to recover from negative events.   
 
The paper takes the modelling task to be to understand how human beings have come 
to be hedonic adapters.  It does not assume that a particular man or woman chooses to 
adapt.  For the person, adaptation is instinctive.  Nature is the rational decision-maker 
and has chosen it for human beings. 
 
In the model developed below, happiness can be thought of as the return on hedonic 
capital.  This interpretation is usefully evocative.  Nevertheless, such an interpretation 
needs to be treated cautiously.  A more accurate statement, which is explained with 
the later algebra, is that some of the return on hedonic capital will be taken in the form 
of current happiness while the remainder is invested to produce well-being in later 
periods. 
 
We show that: 
1. The evolutionary process results in individuals who 
a. Exhibit a steady state level of well-being (a ‘set-point’ in the terminology of 
Diener et al, 1999) 
b. Display adaptive behaviour in response to life-events (“shocks” in our 
model) 
2. The model predicts that the level of hedonic capital will have implications for an 
individual’s psychological resilience: 
                                                     
2 The smoothing in our framework is not simply the equating of marginal utilities across time.  
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a. High levels of hedonic capital imply high psychological resilience i.e. low 
volatility of well-being; 
b. After a negative shock to the level of hedonic capital, individuals will 
substitute towards activities which rebuild their hedonic capital 
c. Income buffers well-being, and will do so more effectively against negative 
shocks than against positive ones. 
 
3. Previous Work 
 
Although it is not easy to explain why there is such a divide over adaptation between 
economists and psychologists, Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) suggest two possible 
reasons.  First, the early empirical evidence was viewed by economists as debatable.  
One of the literature’s most-quoted papers, for instance, is Brickman et al (1978).  It is 
sometimes claimed in the literature that these authors prove that lottery winners are no 
happier than non-winners and paraplegics are as happy as able-bodied individuals.  
On closer inspection, Brickman et al (1978) actually report data in which disabled 
people do have lower life-satisfaction scores than the able-bodied, and this difference, 
when compared to a control group, is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Moreover, lottery winners do have higher life-satisfaction scores than the controls, 
although the null hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected at the 5% level.  
Second, one part of the psychology literature proposes the so-called ‘set point 
hypothesis’, which is the idea that people adapt completely to life shocks.  Rightly or 
wrongly, economists view this position -- that utility effectively cannot be altered by 
outside events -- as sufficiently implausible that they have been loathe to give 
credence even to the idea of partial adaptation.  
 
The paper by Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) is an introduction to hedonic 
adaptation.  Another term used in the literature is ‘affective adaptation’, which, 
following Wilson and Gilbert’s (2005) definition, is where affective responses 
weaken after one or more exposures to a stimulus.  A valuable discussion, with 
examples, is given in Lucas et al (2003).  Earlier evidence is discussed in Argyle 
(2001) and Diener et al (1999).  Easterlin (2003, 2005a, b) argues that adaptation is 
generally incomplete, namely, that people do not merely automatically bounce back to 
a baseline level of happiness.   Clark and Oswald (1994) find some evidence of partial 
 8
adaptation by the long-term unemployed.  Adaptation is also discussed in the 
overviews by Oswald (1997), Diener et al (1999), Frey and Stutzer (2002a, b), Van 
Praag and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2004) and Layard (2005).  
 
A recent paper by Di Tella, Haisken and MacCulloch (2005) has provided more 
evidence.  Using individual panel data on 8000 people living in Germany from 1984 
to 2000, the authors estimate the size of the effect on happiness of adaptation to 
income and to status. They cannot reject the null hypothesis that people adapt totally 
to income after four years. By comparison, significant status effects remain after this 
time. In the short-run (the current year), a one standard deviation increase in status is 
associated with a similar increase in happiness to an increase of 50% of a standard 
deviation in income. In the long run (the past four years), a one standard deviation 
increase in status has a similar effect to an increase of more than 300% of a standard 
deviation in income.  
  
In important theoretical contributions, Rayo and Becker (2007) and Wilson and 
Gilbert (2005) consider why and how human beings adapt.  The first of these, by 
economists, likens hedonic adaptation to the ability of the eye to adjust -- for reasons 
of self-preservation -- to changes in the amount of light.  Although very different from 
our approach, Rayo and Becker set out a mathematical model of how Nature might, in 
the underlying spirit of Robson (2002), have designed human beings’ emotional 
responses to behave a similar way.  Rayo and Becker see happiness as a kind of 
innately adaptive measuring rod.  The second paper, by psychologists, thinks of 
individuals as learning to change what they actually attend to and how they react.  
Wilson and Gilbert suggest that hedonic adaptation is not merely the adaptation that is 
conventionally found in, for instance, an animal’s sensory or motor systems.   The 
authors argue that affective habituation is provoked by something else.  It stems, 
instead, from the need and ability that humans have to make sense of the stimuli 
around them.  Wilson and Gilbert lay out an AREA model -- attend; react; explain; 
adapt -- to explain habituation.   
 
Further evidence is offered by Riis et al (2005).  These authors report remarkable 
evidence consistent with the phenomenon of adaptation.  Using an ecological 
momentary-assessment measure of mood, the authors find that, despite their 
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apparently impaired lives, hemodialysis patients are no less happy than healthy 
people.  The authors suggest that patients in the sample have largely adapted to their 
condition; they show that, in a forecasting task, healthy people fail to anticipate this 
bounce-back in well-being.  Affective forecasting is known to be imperfect (Gilbert et 
al 1998, 2002; Ubel et al 2005).  Other investigators, such as Clark (1999), Clark et al 
(2004), Stutzer (2004) and Layard (2005), have begun to accumulate evidence and to 
consider the economic implications of how people adapt.  Kahneman and Sugden 
(2005) discuss the policy implications of allowing for adaptation in experienced 
utility.  Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001, 2003) study adaptation of national 
happiness to movements in real income.  By estimating dynamic equations, they find 
evidence that the well-being consequences of shocks to gross domestic product 
eventually wear off.  They suggest a way to use difference equations to solve out for a 
steady-state level of habituation.  Conceptually, the adaptation literature might be 
seen as related to new research on well-being and preferences such as Frey and Meier 
(2004) and Frijters et al (2004). 
 
Three building blocks lie behind the paper’s proposed framework.  One is the 
distinction between stocks and flows; a second is the concept of a production function 
for happiness; a third is the notion of investment in hedonic capital.  Although 
unfamiliar to economists, antecedents of each can be found in the psychological 
literature.   
 
Headey and Wearing (1991) point to the difference between stocks and flows -- with 
stocks arising, in their view, from “stable personality characteristics” and flows from 
“events”.  The authors postulate a link between higher levels of a stock and higher 
levels of a person’s well-being.  Heading and Wearing also discuss the need for a 
dynamic equilibrium model in which  
 
“each person is regarded as having ’normal’ equilibrium levels of life 
events and SWB, predictable on the basis of age and personality. Only 
when events deviate from their equilibrium levels does SWB change. 
Unusually favourable events enhance SWB; unusually adverse events 
depress it.” 
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In this vein, a component of our model is a production function which explains how 
hedonic capital produces well-being.  Ormel et al (1999) describe the mechanism by 
which well-being is generated.  They use a social production function, taking the 
inputs to be a range of personality characteristics and life events, and the output to be 
well-being, and suggest, as we later do, that there are diminishing marginal return to 
the inputs.  Ormel et al also have a concept of emotional investment: they make a 
distinction between activities that immediately satisfy a goal and those which increase 
potential for future production. 
 
4. The Framework 
 
This section provides a formal model of a person’s psychological structure and 
describes how, in an uncertain world, evolution might optimally design the 
individual’s response to emotional shocks.   
 
Assume that a human being begins with a given level of psychological coping 
resources.  This stock is hedonic capital3.  Hedonic resources can be used in two 
ways.  They can be taken as happiness today or invested in hedonic capital to produce 
greater well-being tomorrow.  By assumption in our framework, an increasing and 
concave function captures how hedonic capital is used to produce happiness.  
 
Let k represent hedonic capital.  Define y, which might be called hedonic energy, as a 
flow concept that measures the output produced by hedonic capital.   
 
Define a variable v to capture random life-events.  We assume that returns to hedonic 
capital are diminishing, i.e. 0 < α < 1.  A parameter z represents different individual 
types.  For simplicity, the production function of hedonic energy is assumed to take a 
constant-elasticity form: 
 
 t t ty zk v
α= + .        (1) 
 
                                                     
3 Another name for hedonic capital would be emotional capital.  The paper does not use it because this 
term is occasionally employed, although in a slightly different way, in the sociological literature (Reay, 
2004). 
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The principal ideas go through in more general settings. 
 
The flow of hedonic energy y in period t can be used by an individual in alternative 
ways.  One is directly to produce well-being, h, this period (i.e. to make the individual 
happy).  The other use is in the form of an investment activity, denoted now by i.  
Such activities involve forgoing some well-being in order to increase the stock of 
hedonic capital in the future.  
 
The emotional budget equation is: 
 
 t t ty h i= +         (2) 
 
which is an accounting relation.  Finally, investment of hedonic energy leads to an 
increase in the stock of k, while depreciation reduces that stock.  Assume that hedonic 
capital depreciates at rate δ.  Then its law of motion is described by the equation: 
 
 ( )1 1t t t tk k iδ ω+ = − + +         (3) 
 
where ω is a white-noise shock.  These three equations provide a compressed 
description of a human being’s psychological structure. 
 
We are interested in the possible existence of a set of hard-wired behavioural rules 
that might emerge from a Darwinian-like process.  These are to be thought of as the 
solution to a principal-agent problem in which the principal, ‘Nature’, corresponds to 
the process of evolution.  Nature shapes the characteristics of the individual.   
 
Why should happiness -- the well-being of individual agents -- matter to evolution?   
 
The reason is that happiness is useful as a motivation device.  In terms of selfish 
genes, Nature wants individuals to perform with high reproductive success. Imagine, 
by a natural argument, that Nature equips individuals with utility functions.  Hence 
we enjoy having a high income, being powerful, and having sex, among other 
things.  According to such a conceptual account, the happiness induced by particular 
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activities is there merely for efficiency reasons.  The existence of enjoyment in 
human life has a pay-off to Nature: we can be motivated to do things that make us 
reproductively successful. 
  
The paper applies a general version of such an argument and assumes that happiness 
is valuable to Nature because it makes individuals value their lives enough to take 
care of themselves.  Consider a world where that was not true.  Imagine humans were 
routinely miserable (or merely indifferent to being alive).  They would not take care 
when walking on mountain cliffs, chasing prey, fighting, deciding whether to fight, 
and so on.  This would be dangerous evolutionarily; such agents would, consciously 
and unconsciously, routinely commit suicide too often for their genes to replicate 
successfully.  For reproductive efficiency, Nature needs humans to be happy enough 
to stay away from the cliff edge.   
 
The mathematical set-up goes fractionally further.  We assume that Nature cares 
about agents' happiness in a concave way.  Higher and higher happiness, among the 
agents, is less vital to Nature's purpose than the avoidance of low levels.  The risk of a 
low breeding rate is acute at extremely low levels of happiness (the limiting case 
being complete disregard for safety, or suicide), so that, for efficiency reasons, Nature 
will put particular weight on avoiding severe unhappiness. 4 
 
Mental health is as important to successful reproduction as physical health.  There is a 
wide literature on the connection between well-being and a range of variables related 
to the ability to leave large numbers of offspring.  Lyubomirsky et al (2005) assert a 
causal relation between well-being and a range of positive individual characteristics.  
Segerstrom and Miller (2004) show that stress is associated with a suppressed 
                                                     
4 A more formal way to think about this is as Nature recognizing that the environment is unpredictable.  
Imagine that, say, world temperature is a random variable, t, with density f(t).  Agents have utility w(a, 
t, n) which is increasing in t, where n is some happiness-supplement designed ex ante by Nature, and 
where a is an action that can include the outside option of suicide; suicide generates utility 0.  The 
agent’s maximum-value function is then z(t, n).  Temperature is out of Nature’s control, but Nature 
knows that at some Ice-Age-like low temperature t* the agents will find the environment on the margin 
of being too cold for it to be worth living.  The marginal return to Nature of providing a counteracting 
source of extra happiness n at level t* is then, for Nature, extremely high.  But, as t rises away from the 
danger level of z(. .) close to u(0), that marginal return of agents’ happiness to Nature quickly becomes 
smaller. 
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immune system.  A review of medical and psychological evidence is in Wilson and 
Oswald (2005).   
 
Given the complexity of an individual’s psychic make-up (that is, the many different 
factors which contribute to hedonic capital), the individual has an informational 
advantage over the evolutionary process.  Rather than specify the detailed decision 
rules governing each source of well-being, and each possible type of shock, the 
principal chooses a set of decision rules for aggregate measured well-being.  Then the 
principal leaves the agent -- who is better informed -- to act given these background 
rules.  Evolution thus moulds the background characteristics of human beings; 
individual agents make day-to-day decisions. 
 
Nature’s objective is the maximization of a concave function of individual well-being 
levels  
 
 
{ } ( )0 0max lnt t t ih iE h∞=
∞
+
=
∑         (4) 
 
where E is the expectations operator.  This maximization5 is subject to the constraints 
imposed by the psychological structure of the individual, described above by 
equations (1) to (3).  The assumption of logarithmic preferences for Nature is for 
simplicity; it can easily be generalized. 
 
5. Solving the Model  
  
We can write Nature’s maximization problem in standard dynamic programming 
language as a choice of the current level of hedonic capital, k, conditional on an 
optimal choice of next period’s hedonic capital (denoted by a prime on k), where 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
'
, max ln 1 ' ', '
k
V k v k zk v k EV k vαδ β⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦         (5) 
 
                                                     
5 This could be viewed as an application of Ng’s (2000) argument.  The choice of a unit discount factor 
is for simplicity.  We are describing evolution’s problem, not an individual’s, and it is hard to be sure if 
the evolutionary process discounts the future.  On the related issue of inter-generational relative 
standing, see Johansson-Stenman et al (2002). 
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in which the term in square brackets is the current level of happiness as a function of 
today’s k and tomorrow’s k.  
 
The first-order condition, an Euler equation, is 
1 1'
'
Er
h h
β=        (6) 
where 
( ) 11r zkαδ α −= − +       (7) 
At the margin, there is a choice between taking an extra unit of hedonic energy as 
happiness today or investing it to produce happiness tomorrow.  The left-hand side of 
the Euler equation is, given our assumption of logarithmic utility, the marginal benefit 
of the extra unit of happiness in the present period.  The right hand side of equation 
(7) is the marginal benefit of the happiness tomorrow that would be gained from 
investing the extra amount.  If one unit is invested in hedonic capital today, it gives r 
units of hedonic energy tomorrow, comprising the hedonic energy produced from that 
unit, 1zkαα −  and the un-depreciated part of the unit, 1 δ− .  To convert this from units 
of hedonic energy into utility terms, it is weighted by the marginal utility of happiness 
tomorrow. 
 
It is useful to have a benchmark.  Hence consider a steady-state with no events, so 
v=0.  In such a steady-state, we can show6 that the level of hedonic capital is constant 
and given by: 
    
1
1zk
αα
δ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠       (8) 
where this steady-state level of hedonic capital depends, of course, on the underlying 
parameters of the system.  It is an increasing function of z, the efficiency with which 
hedonic capital is used.  It is a decreasing function of δ, the rate at which hedonic 
capital depreciates. 
 
Here the parameter z is a feature of individuals’ psychological make-up7.  The 
parameter plays the role of indexing idiosyncratic characteristics, and it abstracts from 
                                                     
6 In a steady state with constant well-being, equation (6) implies βr = 1.  Using this in 
equation (7), and rearranging, then leads to (8). 
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the complex interaction of genetic and developmental factors which produces “happy” 
individuals (with high z) or unhappy ones (with low z).  We do not investigate what 
determines z.  Instead, the paper later examines how individuals’ response to 
emotional shocks can differ with high or low values of z. 
 
The parameter δ is the rate at which hedonic capital depreciates.  This combines 
features of an individual’s make-up (perhaps how good they are at sustaining 
relationships) with features of society.  In a society with strong community 
attachment and low geographical mobility, hedonic capital might depreciate at a lower 
rate.  In a fragmented and highly mobile society, it might be more difficult to maintain 
attachments.  Then hedonic capital will decay more quickly. 
 
Because hedonic capital depreciates, it will be optimal in this model for the individual 
to use some of the hedonic energy to maintain the stock of hedonic capital.  So the 
steady-state is also characterised by a constant level of investment in hedonic capital -
- at a level just enough to keep the level stable and make up for depreciation.  These 
maintenance activities might be viewed as representing the energy put into, say, 
keeping up friendships and relationships.  
 
The steady-state level of hedonic capital, when combined with the production 
function, (1), gives a steady-state level of well-being: 
 
 ah zk kδ= −        (9) 
 
Equation (9) conveys the paper’s first finding.  The model produces a steady-state in 
which happiness and hedonic capital are constant.  In this sense, the model’s 
assumptions lead to the “set-points” commonly described in the psychological 
literature (e.g., in Diener et al 1999). 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Will the psychological structure described by equations (1) to (3) be optimal from the point of view 
of evolution?  The concave form of the relation between happiness and offspring implies that evolution 
is “risk-averse”; i.e., with the same mean level of happiness, a smooth path gives more offspring than a 
volatile one.  This will mean it will be optimal for evolution to design a smoothing mechanism such as 
that provided by hedonic capital.  We could model this explicitly by specifying a stochastic processes 
for life events, then letting evolution choose the variable z, and hence the steady-state level of hedonic 
capital.  We do not do this, and continue to take z as exogenous, mainly because we are unable to 
quantify the process for life events.  The parameter only matters to the extent that it gives steady-state 
hedonic capital in relation to which life-events are “large” or “small”.   
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Our characterisation of the emotional steady-state can be used to throw light on a 
widely cited empirical observation -- the so-called Easterlin paradox.  This is the 
finding that, while GDP in the West has increased dramatically over the last 50 years, 
measured well-being has remained roughly constant.  See, for example, Easterlin 
(1974) and, on modern data, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).   
 
A number of points emerge.  First, there is no direct relation between income and 
well-being in our model.  Some consequences of increasing GDP, such as widely-
available health-care, better education and insurance, might lead to the parameter z 
increasing between different generations of individuals.  This would tend to increase 
the steady-state level of well-being with time.  However, if the growth in GDP is 
accompanied by an increasing rate of depreciation of hedonic capital -- such as higher 
mobility and the breakdown of traditional communities and roles --  this could offset 
the increase in a.  Then the net movement of well-being would be determined by the 
relative magnitude of the two effects. 
 
The preceding section characterised an individual’s psychological steady-state in 
terms of the underlying parameters of the model.  We think of this psychological 
steady-state as being perturbed by shocks.  These shocks represent events which 
affect the emotional state of an individual.   
 
There are two channels, in this model, through which external events influence the 
individual.  The first is a one-off change in the level of a person’s hedonic capital (ω 
in equation (3)) .  Unemployment, divorce and disability are in this category.  The 
second channel is a temporary event which has no direct effect on the level of hedonic 
capital but requires some psychic resources (υ in equation (1)).  Such events might be 
a temporary illness of the individual or someone close to them.  Real-world events 
will, of course, often be a combination of these two types, but for clarity we analyse 
them in isolation.  The following sections describe how an individual who has been 
optimally hard-wired by evolution would respond.  In reality, life events can often be 
anticipated, either because they depend partly on an individual’s behavior, or because 
the individual can form expectations about the future, which means that well-being 
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changes before the event.  In what follows, however, we assume for simplicity that 
the events are exogenous and random. 
 
In this framework, human beings differ along various dimensions.  As explained, an 
individual type is indexed by three parameters: δ, the rate at which hedonic capital 
depreciates; α, the degree of diminishing returns to hedonic capital; and z.8 Different 
values of these parameters are to be thought of as describing different types of people.  
The only effect of z is to change the steady-state levels of the variables.  As long as 
shocks are small relative to the steady-state, z does not affect the model’s dynamics.  
We choose the two remaining parameters so that the impulse responses produced by 
our model replicate the known data as closely as possible.  Nevertheless, it is useful to 
bear in mind that current empirical studies do not have enough data points to make 
such choices completely reliable.  Well-being in, say, the time-series plots of Gardner 
and Oswald (2006) appears to have a half-life of approximately one year (i.e. it takes 
a year for the level of well-being to decay to half of its value on impact).  Taking the 
base time period to be a month, our model replicates this with α=0.5 and δ=8%. That 
value for parameter δ means that 8% of an individual’s hedonic capital will decay 
each month.  In other words, without investment, roughly two-thirds of the stock of 
hedonic capital will have been lost after a year.  This may seem high, particularly in 
comparison with physical capital.  But it represents an extreme case: a complete lack 
of investment in hedonic capital would imply an absence both of interaction with 
other people and of meaningful activity.  Solitary confinement in prison would be one 
extreme example. 
 
It is necessary to specify a process for the stochastic variable which describes the path 
of life events.  It is here assumed that shocks are random but persistent, and follow a 
first-order autoregressive process 
 
1t t tv vρ ε−= +        (10) 
 
where ρ is a number between zero and one, and ε is a white-noise shock.  The value of 
ρ does not affect our qualitative conclusions, so for simplicity we set it to 0.5. 
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6. Sketching the Time Paths of Happiness h and Hedonic Capital k after Negative and 
Positive Shocks  
 
What does this model predict about dynamics?   
 
Negative shocks to life come in two forms here.  Each induces adaptive behavior, 
although of slightly different kinds.  The time paths, derived from numerical solution, 
are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1 sets out what happens in our optimization model to the trajectory of 
happiness -- first falling and then bouncing back upwards -- after a fall in the level of 
hedonic capital.  In this case what is being studied is the impact of an abrupt life-event 
which destroys part of an individual’s k, a negative innovation to ω in equation (3).  
Potential examples of such an event might be divorce, disability or unemployment.  
The Figure mimics the adaptive pattern observed in empirical research.  
  
The shock in Figure 1 is modelled as a one unit fall in the level of hedonic capital at 
time t = 0.  The baseline level of happiness, set to 1.00 for clarity, represents the 
steady-state.  In the Figure, there is only one external influence on the individual.  
Everything else is determined by the individual’s hard-wired decision rules.   
 
Happiness therefore adapts.  It returns asymptotically to its starting point.  Step by 
step, the mechanics are as follows: 
 
1. The reduction in hedonic capital means:  
 
(a) the marginal return to investing in new hedonic capital increases 
(b) the level of hedonic energy available to the individual decreases. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 There are two other parameters that relate to the evolutionary process.  The first, nature’s discount 
factor, is here normalized to unity. The second, the degree of concavity of the relation between 
happiness and offspring, we take simply to be captured by a log function. 
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2. When deciding to allocate the lower level of hedonic energy between well-
being and investment, the proportion devoted to investment rises.  This is 
because of the higher marginal return. 
 
3. So well-being falls by proportionally more than it would were investment 
constant, but hedonic capital increases.  Current-period well-being is foregone 
for future well-being. 
 
4. In the next period, hedonic capital is higher than on impact, but still below the 
steady-state.  Thereafter, steps 1 – 3 repeat themselves, with the marginal 
return, and hence investment, falling, but still being above the steady-state.  
This continues in each period until all the variables are back at their steady-
state. 
 
How might this process be conceptualized?  Life has worsened.  This individual has 
lost part of his or her hedonic resources.  As a result, the individual puts energy into 
building up new resources to restore the lost hedonic capital.  Taking disability as an 
example, he or she forgoes some parts of the hedonic capital associated with physical 
ability.  In response, hedonic resources are diverted into re-constructing the lost 
capital.  
 
Not all of life’s blows are permanent.  As illustrated in Figure 2, it is straightforward 
to use the framework to study the effect of a life-event which temporarily requires 
some of the individual’s hedonic energy, but has no long-run effects, a negative 
innovation to ε in equation (10).  An example might be a short-run illness of someone 
close to the individual.  After such a temporary shock, well-being will again deviate 
from the steady-state, but the path of well-being in Figure 2 is much smoother than 
the path of the shock.   
 
Technically, Figure 2 models a one-off negative event that slowly decreases in size 
over time.  If hedonic capital was constant in the face of the shock, the story would 
end here: the individual’s well-being would simply follow the path of the life-event.  
When people have a stock of hedonic capital, however, the response of well-being, 
shown by the curved line in Figure 2, is different.  It reacts less initially, but more in 
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later periods.  This is a reminder of the underlying property of hedonic capital: it is 
optimally used to iron out part of the individual’s responses to life events.  In this 
fashion, we have the paper’s third principal result.  When a bad shock strikes, the 
individual allows the stock of hedonic capital to fall, so freeing up hedonic energy to 
deal with the event.  When the event has died away, the individual rebuilds hedonic 
capital.  
 
Because they lie behind the happiness time paths, the trajectories of hedonic capital, 
k, are also of interest.  Figures 3 and 4 set out those for the same negative shocks as in 
Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 3 shows that the adaptation of well-being in Figure 1 is due to 
k gradually returning to its steady state in Figure 3.  Figure 4 shows that the 
smoothing of happiness in Figure 2 is the result of stocks of k being first depleted as 
agents draw down on their coping resources, then rebuilt. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 are the opposite.  They turn to the case of life’s ups rather than downs.  
Now the individual becomes happier, but the burst in happiness gradually falls away, 
and well-being tends asymptotically back towards the steady state of 1.00.  These 
Figures thus correspond to the obverse of the bad shocks of Figures 1 and 2.  Again in 
Figure 5 we see adaptation to the permanent shock; and in Figure 6 smoothing of the 
temporary shock.   Although it should be emphasised again that the underlying nature 
of these two shocks is different -- the former is a one-off permanent change and the 
latter a steadily diminishing one -- the general structure of response in happiness in 
Figures 5 and 6 has the same adaptive form (though the structure of Figure 6 stems 
from the fact that the event is temporary).  Initially, happiness is running flat along the 
steady-state level, given by unity, 1.00.  Then it lifts abruptly.  After that, there is a 
slow ‘habituation’. 
 
Why does the change not make the individual permanently happier?  Decreasing 
returns to hedonic capital will mean that growth in k does not bring about a large 
enough increase in y to sustain the depreciation implied by a permanently higher level 
of capital.  Therefore, although investment in hedonic capital goes up after the shock, 
it does not increase by enough to cover the higher depreciation implied by the greater 
level of hedonic capital.  Put intuitively, if hedonic capital increases, more hedonic 
resources are required to maintain the new level of hedonic capital, whereupon less is 
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available elsewhere.  But such a shock has lasting effects on the composition of 
hedonic capital.  After the life occurrence has died away, the long-run level of 
hedonic capital is the same, but its composition is different. 
 
What happens to hedonic adaptation if there is some lower bound on hedonic capital?  
This is potentially important.  Such a lower bound might correspond to the concept of 
depression.  For an individual whose psychological make-up means their steady-state 
level of hedonic capital is well above the lower bound (represented by a high value of 
z or a low value of δ), and who faces only small shocks, a lower bound will be 
irrelevant.  Only a long sequence of negative shocks would bring the individual’s 
level of hedonic capital near to it.  Nevertheless, consider someone who has a steady-
state level of hedonic capital that is not far from the lower bound (represented by a 
low value of z or a high value of δ).  If a further bad, but temporary, life event hits 
this individual, he or she will use hedonic capital to smooth its effect.  The person will 
initially allow their stock of hedonic capital to fall.  But this exposes the individual to 
a risky situation.  If in the next period there is another negative shock, the amount of 
hedonic capital might drop to the lower bound, with grave consequences.  So the 
individual hoards hedonic capital, meaning that the event is not smoothed as much.  
The same is true of a person subjected to a sequence of negative shocks: if these 
shocks are large relative to the size of the stock of hedonic capital, the extent to which 
they can be smoothed will decline with each shock.   
 
This implies a further result: the extent to which k can be used to smooth life events is 
an increasing function of its level.  To put this in different language, individuals’ 
psychological resilience is dependent on the level of hedonic capital.   
 
For this reason, our model has two implications for such resilience.  First, the larger 
the steady-state level of an individual’s well-being, the more resilient human beings 
will be.  People characterized by a high value of z and/or a low value of δ then 
correspond to what Block and Kremen (1996) describe, without using a formal model, 
as “ego-resilient”.  Those with low value of z and/or a high value of δ will be “ego-
brittle”.  Second, a series of positive shocks will, in a sense, make an individual 
emotionally stronger.  He or becomes better able to absorb the effect of a negative 
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shock.  In a cumulative way, positive shocks can buffer a negative one.  There is 
indeed evidence of such buffering in the psychology literature: Fredrickson (2001) 
writes that "individuals who experienced more positive emotions than others became 
more resilient to adversity over time". 
 
Need it be the case that happiness goes back, given a long enough span of time, to the 
original steady-state?  That is the extreme ‘set point’ view (discussed in detail, for 
example, in Fujita and Diener (2005)).  The answer, however, is no.  Figure 7 shows 
how our model can generate a return to a lower permanent level of happiness.  
Sufficient conditions to obtain this result are that both hedonic capital k and the 
efficiency parameter z drop at the same time.  In this case, two life phenomena occur 
at time t=0, and, although the person recovers much of the original level of happiness, 
the steady-state level of well-being is permanently lower than 1.00 even as t extends 
indefinitely beyond period 18 marked on Figure 7. 
 
In principle, as Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) and others have pointed out, decision-
makers such as judges in legal compensation cases will sometimes need to take a view 
on whether happiness is fully mean-reverting (that is, returning literally to the value 
1.00).  Paradoxically, although the issue is conceptually of fundamental importance to 
this field, and has been the subject of intense debate in the empirical literature (such 
as in Easterlin 2003), in many practical cases it may not matter whether there is, say, 
90% or exactly 100% adaptation.  Imagine, for example, that Time in Figures 1 and 7 
is in years.  Then, given data in which there is some measurement error, after a decade 
it may be impossible statistically to detect reliably the difference between the settings 
of Figure 1 and Figure 7.  
 
Finally, there are four potential roles for income in our model.   
 
First, as we discussed in section 3, increased income can have direct effects on the 
steady state level of well-being by increasing the steady-state level of hedonic capital 
through, for example, better health care or risk diversification.  Second, an increase of 
income might raise an individual’s sense of status, a component of their hedonic 
capital.  Such effects will be transient in our model, however, as will those of any 
one-off increase in hedonic capital, even without the peer comparison effects that are 
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empirically important in evaluation of status.  Third, income can help to buffer 
negative shocks by giving an individual more opportunity to invest in new hedonic 
capital.  Fourth, although we have not included it in our model, a natural possible 
extension would be to think of a subsistence level of income -- a level below which an 
individual’s ability to employ their own stock of hedonic capital declines.  The model 
provides a reasonably general framework in which to think about the relationship 
between income and happiness, and each of income’s four roles has potentially 
testable consequences.    
 
7. Generalizing the Framework 
 
For clarity, we have assumed that the only determinants of well-being are the level of 
hedonic capital and the life-events that strike the human being.  To use the 
terminology of Ormel et al (1999), our social production function contains only a 
single factor of production.  We have alluded to the idea that there are many types of 
hedonic capital, and that adaptation to life events might involve substituting between 
types in the way described by Ormel et al (1999).  Also, time might be an important 
factor in the production function.  Wilson et al (2005) suggest that time is needed to 
“make sense” of new events.  All these factors could be incorporated into our model 
by replacing Equation 1 with a production function that distinguishes between 
different types of capital and allows for other influences on well-being. 
 
What if the ease with which individuals can invest in hedonic capital depends upon 
the level of hedonic capital?  The intuition here would be that it is arguably easier to 
make friends if one has lots of them.  We could include this in our model by adding a 
production function for investment, showing how both hedonic energy and hedonic 
capital are needed to produce new hedonic capital.   
 
The framework assumes that investment in hedonic capital and current period well-
being are strictly exclusive uses of hedonic energy.  Other conceptions are possible.  
Our model relies on there being some trade-off between current period well-being and 
investment.  But it would be straightforward to extend the model to allow the 
assumption that investment directly generates some well-being.   
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With such extensions, the model would be able to make predictions about how the 
dynamic response of well-being to life events varies with the type of individual.   
 
Another feature of the analysis here is a division of life-events into two types – those 
with a permanent effect on the level of hedonic capital and those with only a 
temporary effect.  Neither permits permanent effects on the steady-state: neglecting 
the lower bound, hedonic capital and well-being will always adjust back to their 
baseline.  However, as in Lucas et al (2004), there is reason to believe that some of 
life’s occurrences (for example, marriage) have a permanent effect on well-being, 
although the size of the permanent consequences may be smaller than the temporary 
consequences.  As captured in Figure 7, this would correspond here to the life event 
leading to a change in the parameter z on how efficiently hedonic capital is used. 
 
The paper has modelled decision rules that Nature could hard-wire into individuals.  
What if the opportunities to take the action prescribed by those rules are not 
available?  After some hedonic capital is destroyed, it will be optimal for the 
individual to build up a new stock to replace that lost.  If there are no opportunities to 
do this (as an extreme case, return to the example of a prisoner in solitary 
confinement), the level of k, and hence h, will fall to the lower bound. 
 
An interesting asymmetry emerges.  Adjustment back to the steady-state after a 
positive shock to hedonic capital happens mainly because of depreciation, which is 
independent of investment opportunities.  Yet adjustment from a negative shock may 
require investment in new types of hedonic capital.   Hence it will be dependent on 
opportunities for such investment being available.  This potentially goes some way to 
explaining the observation that, while income does not have large effects on the mean 
level of well-being, it can buffer the response of well-being to a negative shock 
(Smith et al (2005)).  Income creates opportunities for investment in hedonic capital.  
That allows an individual to recover from a negative shock, but income will have no 
significant effect on the response to a positive shock. 
 
8. Further Empirical Implications 
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We have shown how modelling hedonic capital can provide a conceptual account of 
the empirical facts of adaptation, the key empirical regularity of the well-being 
literature.  However, models of an endogenous reference level also account for 
adaptation.  In this section we describe four empirical predictions which our model 
makes but about which reference-level models are silent.  These are: 
 
a. High levels of hedonic capital imply high well-being; 
b. High levels of hedonic capital high psychological resilience i.e. low volatility of 
well-being; 
c. After a negative shock to the level of hedonic capital, individuals substitute 
towards activities which rebuild their hedonic capital 
d. Income buffers well-being, and does so more effectively against negative shocks 
than against positive ones. 
 
Micro data sets contain questions relating to components of hedonic capital such as 
length of relationship, contact with friends, health, and self-esteem.  A number of 
studies use such data to investigate questions related to our first prediction.  A recent 
example is Aslam and Corrado (2007) which finds that higher levels of a range of 
stock-like variables imply a higher level of well-being.  There is much less work on 
our second prediction: Clark and Lelkes (2005) shows that religion can buffer well-
being; Graham, Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) use two distinct panel datasets from 
Germany and Britain to show that high levels of the various components of hedonic 
capital result in lower volatility of well-being. 
 
Time-use data could be used to examine the third prediction.  After a negative shock, 
do people spend more time on activities which build up their hedonic capital?  Do 
they take up new activities which could provide them with new sources of hedonic 
capital?  These are predictions are testable. 
 
There already exists some evidence to support the framework’s fourth prediction (see 
the results of Smith et al, 2005).  This interesting and unusual study, which looks at 
the buffering effects of income after disability, could be extended in ways suggested 
by the theory.  Richer data set would allow tests for buffering effects in the face of a 
wider range of shocks.  Our model also has implications for how the time-path of 
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well-being after a shock depends on underlying parameters.  Existing data sets are 
rich enough to allow a start on tests of such predictions.  
 
Another application of our model is as a way of structuring the discussion of life 
events in well-being research.  The model suggests that influences on well-being 
should be understood either as changes to the parameters of the model (notably δ, the 
rate at which hedonic capital depreciates and z, the efficiency with which an 
individual uses their hedonic capital) or as shocks either to the level of hedonic capital 
or to the flow of psychological resources.  The first type of event will have long-run 
effects on an individual’s well-being, the second type only short run effects.   Whether 
a particular type of life event falls into one category or another is a matter for further 
empirical research, guided by the conceptual framework our model provides. 
 
One example of this would be to throw light on the Easterlin paradox.  Some 
consequences of increasing GDP, such as widely-available health-care, education and 
insurance might lead to the parameter z increasing between different generations.  
This would increase the steady-state level of well-being with time.  However, if the 
growth in GDP is accompanied by an increasing rate of depreciation of hedonic 
capital -- such as higher mobility and the breakdown of traditional communities and 
roles -- this could offset the increase in z.  Then the net movement of well-being 
would be determined by the relative magnitude of the two effects. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
This paper studies the dynamics of human well-being and suggests a formal theory of 
hedonic adaptation.  Central to the analysis is a notion we refer to as hedonic capital.  
This can be viewed as the level of psychological coping resources, or as the stock to 
which the economist’s idea of a flow of ‘utility’ corresponds.   
 
The model is abstract but the paper’s motivation is meant to be practical.  Its aim is to 
fashion an internally consistent framework that can make sense of the observed 
puzzling resilience and adaptability of mental well-being.  Hedonic adaptation occurs 
when shocks -- becoming disabled or winning the lottery, for example -- gradually 
wear off.  There is now much evidence for phenomena of this kind.  Yet adaptive 
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behavior creates fundamental conceptual problems for the subject of economics.  
Standard economic models do not fit the facts. 
  
We propose as a concept a person’s level of hedonic capital, k.  It is defined in the 
paper as the stock of psychological coping resources available to the individual.   
Happiness is then akin to a return9 on hedonic capital.  We argue that the key 
characteristic of hedonic capital is that it can be drawn down in a crisis (or, 
correspondingly, built up in better times).  In the same general spirit as Rayo and 
Becker (2007) and Wilson and Gilbert (2005), the paper analyses the nature and roots 
of habituation.  In our framework, however, hedonic capital binds together the present 
and the future.  
 
The paper provides an analytical model of well-being in which Nature optimally 
designs human beings’ reactions in such a way that bad life-shocks are smoothed by 
the depletion of hedonic capital.  Good life-shocks lead, equivalently, to a happiness 
response that is damped and mean-reverting.  Our framework mimics the key facts of 
the empirical well-being literature: (i) the existence of a stable mean level of well-
being and (ii) adaptation towards that level.  Depending on the exact assumptions 
made, the model leads to full or partial adaptation. 
 
Just as the psychology and economics literatures now examine data on psychological 
well-being, so, we conjecture, might it become possible to study empirically the level 
and rate of change of hedonic capital.  To do this, it will be necessary to use new 
measurements, and to ask different kinds of questions than in our existing surveys.  
Those measurements and questions will explore the nature of mental stocks. 
                                                     
9 As explained earlier, this intuitive statement should be tempered by the more precise technical one 
that hedonic capital in the model is used both for current happiness and to invest in future well-being. 
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Appendix 
 
A Two Period Model 
 
The paper has relied largely on numerical solution.  As a pedagogical aid, it is helpful 
to give simple analytical results for a two-period version of the model.   
 
Nature designs human beings.  In each period, Nature’s ‘utility’ is an increasing 
function n(h), where h is the happiness of the agent.  Assume that n(.) is concave and 
differentiable.  Let there be two periods.  Assume there is a discount factor, beta.  
Nature then maximizes a discounted sum of two utility levels.  Assume, moreover, 
that this mini-society has an initial endowment of hedonic energy.  Denote it as y.  It 
can be converted into a flow of happiness today or invested to create a flow of extra 
happiness in the second period.  Denote the amount of emotional endowment held 
over to the second period as k.  Assume that happiness in the second period is given 
by a concave ‘production’ function f(k).  In this 2-period framework, the functional 
forms and the discounting assumptions are more general than in the multi-period 
model of the paper.  
 
These assumptions lead to the following.  Nature maximizes a concave weighted sum 
of agents’ happiness levels across the present and the future: 
 
)()( 10 hnhnW β+=       (A1) 
 
where the hedonic energy budget constraint is 
 
khy += 0        (A2) 
 
and happiness in the second period depends solely on the emotional endowment left 
over from the first period so that 
 
).(1 kfh =        (A3)  
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This framework, with just two periods, can produce the appearance of a form of 
hedonic adaptation (a tendency to a form of mean-reversion).  High happiness is 
followed by low happiness.  Low happiness is followed by high happiness.  To 
establish this, note that the structure can be converted into a single-variable 
maximization problem in which k, the amount of the endowment put into investment, 
which becomes the level of hedonic capital in the final period, is optimally decided by 
Nature.  The exogenous parameter here is y, which is the size of the starting 
endowment.  
 
The problem is then that of finding a turning point in the function  
 
))(()( kfnkynW β+−=        (A4) 
 
so at an interior maximum 
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This first-order condition defines Nature’s rational amount of investment in the future, 
k, given a starting endowment, y.  Let the resulting implicit function be rewritten as 
k=k(y).  As y increases, the optimal amount of k also increases.  Its gradient follows 
from the cross-partial of Nature’s maximand in equation (A4).  That cross-partial’s 
sign is given by 
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where, in general, the inequality will hold strictly, so the implied k(y) function is 
strictly increasing in y.  
 
From the first-order condition, (A5), we know that 
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A natural benchmark case is that of equal happiness in each period: h1 = h0.  Hence 
define a value of y*, and by monotonicity an implied k* value, that corresponds to 
this case and also satisfies equation (A7).  It is straightforward to check that y* is 
unique.  The value of k* so defined is, from equation (A7), the value of k that solves 
.01*)( =−′ kfβ        (A8) 
There is an associated y*.  At y* and k*, happiness in the present h0 is identical to 
happiness in the future h1.  Happiness is steady through time. 
To see how a kind of hedonic adaptation then emerges, consider what happens if we 
move away, either up or down, from the benchmark point. 
Case I: The happiness path with an endowment greater than y*.   
Now imagine a society that is richer in emotional endowment.  Such a society has a 
level of y > y*.  It therefore has a second-period hedonic capital stock k > k*.  But 
then, by equation (A8) and the first order condition (A5), it follows that 
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Given strict concavity of the happiness production function, this inequality holds 
strictly, so that h1 > h0.  In this case, therefore, happiness starts high in the first period 
and drops in the second.   
Case II: The happiness path with an endowment less than y*.   
Alternatively, consider the case where y<y*.  Then k < k*.  By strict concavity of 
f(k), we have 
1)( >′ kfβ       (A10) 
and thus  
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so that the optimal levels of happiness are such that h1 < h0.  In this case, happiness 
starts low in the first period and rises in the second.  
A form of well-being reversal is found in Cases I and II.  Good times, or in other 
words a large endowment of y, act to trigger the appearance of adaptation -- a 
retrenchment in happiness -- with h1 below h0.  In the second period, happiness drops 
below that in the first period.  Bad times have the opposite character.  They result in 
h0 less than h1.  In the second period, happiness is higher than in the first period.   
 
This framework does not have the generality of the multi-period model of the paper 
but it provides an intuitive statement and easy analytical derivation.  Below the 
surface, it is once again concavity and optimization-across-periods, along with the 
assumption of hedonic capital, that together lead to rational habituation.  Although the 
existence of discounting affects the exact happiness profile through time, it can be 
checked algebraically that the discount factor itself is not what accounts for the 
existence of adaptation. 
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Figure 1 
The Time Path of Happiness after a Negative Shock to Hedonic Capital (a one-
off shock to k) 
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Figure 2   
The Time Path of Happiness after a Negative Shock to Hedonic Energy (a slowly 
dissipating shock to y) 
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Figure 3   
The Time Path of Hedonic Capital after a Negative Shock to Hedonic Capital (a 
one-off shock to k) 
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Figure 4   
The Time Path of Hedonic Capital after a Negative Shock to Hedonic Energy (a 
slowly dissipating shock to y) 
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Figure 5   
The Time Path of Happiness after a Positive Shock to Hedonic Capital (a one-off 
shock to k) 
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Figure 6   
The Time Path of Happiness after a Positive Shock to Hedonic Energy (a slowly 
dissipating shock to y) 
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Figure 7   
The Time Path of Happiness after a Negative Shock to Hedonic Capital and a 
Decline in its Efficiency Parameter (a one-off shock to k and permanent fall in z) 
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